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LIBERALIZATION AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE PRE-EMINENT 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN THE ‘SALE’ OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
ABROAD 
___________________________________________________________________ 
ABSTRACT 
Much recent scholarship concerning liberalization has emphasized the role of regulatees, 
rather than governments, in promoting liberalization. This article examines such 
scholarship in the light of an important development in the British and French public 
sectors- the creation of new agencies to ‘sell’ British and French higher education to 
potential international students. The new agencies, EduFrance and the Education 
Counselling Service, attempted to induce both competition amongst higher education 
institutions (HEIs) for the recruitment of international students from developed and 
emerging economy countries, and the commodification of these students. This article 
shows that, contrary to existing theories of liberalization, governments were pre-eminent 
in pushing forward this liberalization, whilst regulatees (HEIs) attempted to hold it back.  
 
INTRODUCTION: EXISTING THEORIES OF LIBERALIZATION 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen’s recent work on liberalization can be seen as the 
‘state of the art’ on the subject, offering a good example of contemporary accounts of 
liberalization. Streeck and Thelen have defined liberalization as ‘an expansion of market 
relations… significantly beyond the limits (of) the organized capitalism of the post-war 
“mixed economy”’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p.2). Why might such an ‘expansion of 
market relations’ occur?  
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Streeck and Thelen explain the different ways in which liberalization occurs by invoking 
five different mechanisms of ‘gradual yet transformative change’ (ibid., p.33); 
displacement, layering, drifting, conversion and exhaustion. None of these five 
mechanisms of change are purely exogenous; even displacement from foreign institutions 
requires a degree of support from actors involved in existing institutions. All processes of 
liberalizing change thus require economic actors to defect from existing, collective 
institutions towards new, liberalizing ones. Hence, all ‘that may be needed for 
liberalization to progress’ is for economic actors to be given ‘a market alternative to an 
existing system based on collective solidarity, and then give free rein to the private 
insurance companies and their sales forces’. As Saunders rightly comments, Streeck and 
Thelen’s work constitutes a significant challenge to existing analyses of institutional 
change, which he describes as ‘state-centric’ (Saunders 2007, p.10). 
 
Streeck and Thelen’s analysis is echoed by other works which have sought to identify the 
mechanisms by which liberalization is pushed forward. Djelic and Quack, for example, 
similarly maintain that changes can be ‘pushed along’ only by ‘foreign actors carrying 
challenger rules or by domestic actors acquiring new experiences and habits abroad’ 
(Djelic and Quack 2003a, p.9). For Djelic and Quack, as for Streeck and Thelen, national 
governments are not seen as potential creators of new rules (Djelic and Quack 2003b, 
p.306).  
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Certainly, Streeck and Thelen’s analysis is confirmed by cases like the liberalization of 
the German banking industry, which as Deeg has documented, was pushed forward by a 
number of indigeneous firms (Deeg 1998, p.87; see also Kleiner 2003, p.63). However, 
the recognition that economic actors can play an important role in promoting 
liberalization should not obscure the importance of governments in this area.  The failure 
to consider governments as potential ‘liberalizers’ reflects the common view in 
comparative political economy that liberalization requires a lesser extent of 
institutionalisation and thus government intervention than does the creation of collective 
institutions (Goodin 2003). 
 
According to this view, the market can be viewed as a ‘kind of natural, or normal, order’ 
(Hodgson 1988, pp.177-8). Yet, rather than constituting a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, markets must be ‘politically and culturally constructed’ (Zysman 1994, 
p.245). As Weiss has explained, governments ‘do not simply support accumulation in an 
undifferentiated way’, but ‘actively channel and mould economic activity into particular 
forms’ (Weiss 1988, p.3). 
 
It was just such a creation of new institutional patterns by government that characterized 
the liberalization of international students’ policy in both Britain and France. 
Governments can play a key role in conceiving of and institutionalizing change, which is 
often in the face of widespread resistance, rather than quiescent acceptance. This is 
because governments possess the unique ability, as the makers of legitimate rules, to 
design new institutions, which provide the incentives and constraints within which 
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regulatees operate. In this way, governments’ rule-making can lead to changes in 
regulatees’ behaviour, either in favour of or against liberalization (where regulatees are 
given incentives towards or constraints against competing with each other, and 
commodifying particular factors). As this article will demonstrate, it was the activity of 
governments, rather than of the regulates (HEIs), which led to the creation of new 
agencies which promoted liberalization: the Education Counselling Service (ECS) and 
EduFrance. 
 
The article is based on an analysis of documentary sources (government documents, 
legislation, sectoral associations’ documents, press releases and press sources), and 
interviews with over twenty representatives from the British and French higher education 
sectors, promotional agencies and government departments, conducted between May 
2003 and November 2006. 
 
THE NEW AGENCIES AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS’ POLICY 
 
The higher education context 
 
Virtually since their inception, each sector has been characterized by a struggle between 
HEIs and governing authority (first ecclesiastic and then secular) over both resources and 
control over standards (Rashdall 1936). More recently, both sectors have been affected by 
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so-called ‘massification’ as well as renewed pressures towards ‘internationalization’ 
(Scott 1998). 
 
Funding 
Compared with French HEIs, British HEIs are required to derive a much larger 
proportion of their funding from private sources. However, very few universities and 
higher education colleges do not receive any public funding, with around two thirds of 
funding for British universities and colleges still derived from central government 
(OECD 2006, Table B3.1).   
 
Until 1972-77, British universities were funded through a stable, ‘unselective’ flow of 
unpredicated quinquennial funding grants, disbursed through the University Grants 
Committee (the UGC, later renamed the UFC, Universities Funding Council) (Merrison 
1980, p.287, Cave et al. 1995, p.93; Trow 1996, p.3).  In the mid-1970s, however, the 
UGC’s provision of capital funding diminished (Kogan and Hanney 2000, p.148;  Moore 
1987), and a triennial funding system was established. From the end of the 1970s 
onwards the unit of resource per student was progressively reduced (Kogan and Hanney 
2000, p.85; Kogan and Kogan 1983, p.25; Cuthbert 1987, p.53).  
 
The proportion of French public funding for HEIs is greater than in Britain, both for 
public universities and public (and even some private) grandes écoles. Universities are 
almost entirely publicly funded and teaching posts are directly distributed by the state, 
with many university teachers being classified as civil servants (Musselin 2001). Funding 
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for teaching in the French university funding system was until recently exclusively 
formula-based (Decker 1998, pp.220-2). Since 1981, as Neave described it, ‘French 
higher education has embarked on [an] ambitious’ programme ‘of reform’ (Neave 1991, 
p. 65). From this point onwards, government has appeared to promote the autonomy of 
universities, particularly through a new, ‘contractual’ funding system, which required 
HEIs to negotiate with government for resources (Friedberg and Musselin 1993).  
 
Control over standards 
 
In both countries, university status can only be obtained following governmental 
approval. In the British case, this occurs through Royal Charter. In the French case, the 
loi Faure of 1968 introduced, for the first time, a legislative framework for universities, 
as opposed to faculties, which was compounded in 1984 by the loi Savary’s emphasis on 
the creation of coherent universities rather than collections of faculties.   
 
Turning to assessment of the quality of degrees, in Britain this is assessed ex post, by the 
Quality Assurance Agency; and research quality is also assessed ex post, through the 
‘Research Assessment Exercise’ (Brown 2004, p.11).  The only cases where ex ante 
control of quality has occurred, is where professional associations have accredited 
courses (Neave 1994). In contrast, French governments directly assess the quality of 
university degrees before they are presented to students, during the process of 
‘habilitation des diplômes’ (Bertrand 1994, p.58).  Government lacks such powers 
concerning the degrees offered by grandes écoles. Grandes écoles were set up during the 
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Napoleonic era as a training ground for the “administrative, political, technical, academic 
and, ultimately, social elite” (Deer 2005, p.37). Latterly so-called ‘consulaire’ grandes 
écoles have been created by local Chambers of Commerce, concentrating on technical 
skills required by local industries. As a result the grandes écoles sector is very diverse, 
with government control greatest over the most prestigious grandes écoles, particularly 
over those which come under the aegis of the Minister of Education. For these grandes 
écoles, government ex ante control over degree content also applies (Neave 1994, p.118).  
 
In both countries, the attribution of degree-awarding powers, the control of quality and 
the funding of higher education are all dominated by central government. In particular, 
governments’ abilities to set rules governing standards and the allocation of resources 
have been particularly important in both higher education sectors.  
 
International students in Britain and France 
France and Britain have traditionally been two of the most important ‘importers’ of 
Non-European international students worldwide, with 165, 437 international students 
attending French HEIs in 2002 and 227,273 in Britain that year (OECD 2004, Table 
C3.7) (henceforth, ‘international students’ should be taken to refer to non-European 
international students). Both countries have historically educated large numbers of 
international students as a means of maintaining diplomatic influence and promoting 
international development (Robbins 1963; Poujol 1965; Braithwaite 2001).  
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Up to 1979, rather than international students being recruited to British and French HEIs, 
they were “accepted” (Humfrey 1999, p.8; Kinnell 1990, p.13). Most international 
students in both countries were concentrated in a small number of HEIs; in Britain, in 
London University, Oxford and Cambridge; and in France, in the universities of the Paris 
area (Braithwaite 2001, p.70; Humfrey 1999, p.8; Klineberg and Ben Brika 1972).  
 
The type of students recruited, and governments’ approaches to them, have changed 
radically away from this model over the last thirty years. Currently, in both countries, 
governments view higher education as an important industry, with international students 
categorized as an ‘invisible export’, and international education ‘represented as an export 
industry’ (Blair 1999; Raffarin 2003; see also O’Leary 1990; Overseas Student Trust 
1992, p.66; Warner and Palfreyman 1999, p.x).  
 
There is a burgeoning literature concerning the benefits of internationalization to the 
student, to individual HEIs and to students’ home and recipient countries (see CVCP 
1998, Ryan 2000 and Allen and Higgins 1994). Rather than engaging with this material, 
this article will instead concentrate on policies towards international students, and 
question the extent to which liberalization has occurred following the introduction of new 
promotional agencies in each country.  
 
Policies towards international students and liberalization 
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Governments in both countries have aimed, since 1979, at promoting the development of 
‘market relations’ amongst HEIs, a policy which could be described accurately as 
‘liberalization’. Following Streeck and Thelen’s definition, two new types of ‘market 
relations’ developed in the British and French higher education sectors following the 
creation of EduFrance and the Education Counselling Service. The first new ‘market 
relation’ was an increasingly competitive one between HEIs for the recruitment of 
international students from developed and emerging economy countries. 
 
‘Competition’ intimates the conflictual relationships resultant from different 
organisations attempting to reach a goal that they cannot all achieve in equal measure 
(Bok 2003, p.159): in this case, different HEIs attempting to recruit as many international 
students from developed and emerging economy countries as was possible, consistent 
with other institutional imperatives. Although the ECS was able to promote competition 
between British HEIs, EduFrance was less successful in this area, perhaps due to the 
coordination of resistance to liberalization amongst French HEIs. 
 
The second new ‘market relation’ was between HEIs and international students, and 
involved the ‘commodification’ of such students. ‘Commodification’ occurred where 
international students’ value for HEIs was restricted to its monetary worth. The students 
became ‘a commodity to be valued mainly for the income they generate’, as Williams 
described the international student body in Britain (Williams 1987, p.10). Both British 
and French HEIs were led to commodify international students following the activities of 
the ECS and EduFrance. 
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The rest of this section examines the extent to which each government was able to 
promote such liberalization through the creation of the ECS and EduFrance respectively. 
It indicates that commodification was promoted in both countries, but that competition 
for international student recruitment was more prevalent in Britain than in France. 
 
- The ECS and the liberalization of international student recruitment 
The ECS was created in 1984, following two decisions by government: to follow the 
recommendations of the ‘Pliatzky review’ to abolish a previous organization, the Inter-
University Council, and to follow civil servants’ suggestions to create the ECS out of the 
British Council’s Higher Education Division. The ECS led to both the commodification 
of international students and competition between HEIs for the recruitment of such 
students, and was thus pivotal in promoting liberalization. This is clear, firstly, from the 
fact that the agency targeted its promotional programmes on students from developed and 
emerging economy countries (rather than on developing countries), and urged HEIs to 
recruit international students for their monetary value rather than for purposes of 
international development or for foreign policy reasons. Particular countries were picked 
out for special marketing campaigns by the ECS on the basis of their perceived economic 
importance to Britain (Trend 2001). The students recruited by the ECS were seen as 
likely to constitute the ‘future elite’ in target countries, acting as ‘movers and shakers 
when they return to their own country’, and eventually able to bring financial rewards 
both to Britain and to individual HEIs (Education Counselling Service 1999; see also 
Pickard 2000; Wyatt 2002). 
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Furthermore, the ECS suggested that HEIs should change their courses in order to attract 
international students from ‘target markets’. A consultant hired by the ECS maintained, 
in a report for the agency, that a ‘shift’ was required from the 'product focused ethos 
[sic.] that dominates institutions currently’ to ‘a far stronger customer focused and market 
oriented approach’ (Gilligan 2000, pp.6-8). This was echoed in comments by the 
agency’s then Director, Allan Barnes, that HEIs should seek to ‘ensure a degree of 
differentiation in the product offer’, through offering ‘[a]ttractive and innovative 
programmes with high added value that meet the market need’ (Barnes 2000a, pp.13-4), 
and in the ‘Gilligan report’ on the marketing of British higher education (Gilligan 2000; 
see also Barnes 2000b, p.3). 
 
Overall, therefore, the ECS led to the commodification of international students, through 
prompting HEIs to reorient their recruitment away from students in developing countries, 
and to adapt their courses to meet the needs of students in ‘target markets’. This part of 
the ECS’ role increased in importance from 1998 onwards, following the creation of a so-
called ‘brand’ for UK higher, further, and private primary and secondary education, the 
‘EducationUK’ brand, created under the aegis of the ‘Prime Minister’s Initiative’.  
 
The response of British HEIs to such commodification was initially hostile, but 
eventually became accepted over time. As Professor John Ashworth, then Vice-
Chancellor of Salford University, maintained, prior to 1981 ‘the very idea of simply 
‘marketing’ higher education would have struck most dons in Britain’s universities as 
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demeaning and certainly conduct unbecoming to the scholars and gentlemen so many of 
them aspired to be… Now the universities are marketing themselves…with a vigour that 
reminds one of Johnson’s wry observation of the way in which the prospect of hanging 
concentrates the mind’ (reported in Shotnes, 1987: 101). As one faculty leader 
interviewed by Williams and Evans rather bluntly put it, ‘[l]et’s be quite frank, we want 
the money, we want international students’ (Williams and Evans 2005, p.75).  
 
The ECS also indirectly promoted competition amongst HEIs for the recruitment of 
international students. One can discern differentiation between HEIs on grounds of 
perceived quality, with the Russell Group of old research universities being the main 
beneficiary of this differentiation. Hence, for instance, the ECS’ Dubai office has been 
used by Strathclyde University as the focal point for delivery of the latter’s Masters in 
Business Administration (MBA); the ECS offered its offices ‘for the use of the better UK 
universities’ following the imposition of a strict registration process by the Hong Kong 
authorities; and it allowed Oxford University to use its offices for holding the 
examinations required by its distance learning programmes (Unattributed 1996a; 
Unattributed 1996b; Targett 1998). Such differentiation has increased the level of 
competition between HEIs, who have been required to distinguish their ‘offer’ from that 
of other HEIs in order to receive help from the ECS. 
 
More recently, the ECS has ceased to work with only one HEI in any particular country, 
in order to show its ‘even-handedness’. As an interviewee from the British Council 
suggested, whilst the ECS continues to advise HEIs to collaborate where otherwise they 
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might risk ‘swamping’ the market and thus wasting their own resources, the ECS has no 
ability to alter the ‘strategic marketing judgement[s]’ arrived at by individual HEIs, even 
where the ECS feels that these might damage ‘UK Plc’ as a whole. However, a recent 
report produced by the ECS (the ‘Gilligan report’ mentioned above) advocated that the 
agency should again attempt to differentiate between HEIs in the provision of its services 
(Education Counselling Service 2000, Section 3.2). This has paralleled calls from a 
number of ECS outposts which have promoted the development of ‘pilot schemes along 
the lines of placement agencies’ (Walker 1997,  p.256). A second ‘Prime Minister’s 
Initiative’ was launched in 2006. At the time of writing, it is not entirely clear what type 
of restructuring will occur within the ECS following the start of this new period. 
 
Such competition between HEIs for international students has proceeded apace since the 
1980s, to the extent that collaborative approaches amongst HEIs for the recruitment of 
international students have become extremely difficult to put in place. As Journeaux puts 
it, current levels of competition ‘allow[..] for very little collective consideration and 
deliberation of a way forward even when nearly all institutions are facing similar issues’ 
(Journeaux, 2004). The CVCP’s own Long-Term Strategy Group acknowledged this 
problem, stating that ‘[c]ompetition between institutions has meant that co-operation and 
the pooling of resources are not well advanced’ (Brown 1999). 
 
- EduFrance and the liberalization of international student recruitment 
EduFrance was created by the French government in 1998 to improve France’s position 
in the ‘international higher education market’ (Gilbert 1999; Davidenkoff 2000). As with 
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the ECS, the agency was promoted by government with minimal initial involvement from 
HEIs. Indeed, HEIs tried to prevent the agency from promoting liberalization, by arguing 
for a change in its management away from EduFrance’s first Director General, who was 
strongly pro-liberalization. Although the HEIs had created their own international 
organization in 1992, ‘ARIES’, this was abolished in 1995 after governmental funding 
was withdrawn, and was not mentioned in the debates concerning the creation of 
EduFrance. EduFrance was a joint project between the then Minister of Education, 
Claude Allègre and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine. Both the Education 
and Foreign Affairs ministries had been attempting to improve France’s presence at 
international higher education events from the mid-1990s onwards (Bloche 2000, Sect.2). 
 
Although EduFrance did not appear to promote competition between HEIs for the 
recruitment of international students, it was explicitly linked to a commodification of 
these students. Claude Allègre maintained that the agency’s role in bringing more 
international students to France was part of the commodification of ‘intellectual grey 
matter’: 
‘We suddenly realize that this intellectual grey matter carries with it the same 
consequences as every primary material: commerce, money, power, temptation to 
monopoly, in brief what transforms every object- whether or not it is an intellectual 
object- into a commodity. It is in the same spirit that we search to improve the 
international profile of our intellectual profile: the creation of the EduFrance agency to 
bring more international students…’ (Allègre 1999). 
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This view of EduFrance was shared by one of the Education Ministry civil servants 
interviewed, who maintained that EduFrance ‘is an agency with a commercial goal’, 
which explained why ‘the African public are not targeted by EduFrance’. The goal of 
EduFrance was thus ‘to search for the rich and very good students, and to make them 
come here. It is a policy which one absolutely cannot use in Africa’. 
 
The creation of EduFrance has been cited, alongside other changes, as underlining 
the priority given to the training of foreign elites in France (Perrut 2001). EduFrance put 
into practice governmental plans developed as early as 1993 to re-focus international 
student recruitment on particular developed and emerging economies seen as key growth 
markets for French high-end products, particularly in South-East Asia and Latin America 
(Raymond 1993). EduFrance’s activities were comparable to those of other agencies 
operating along commercial lines and were modelled on the existing practices of France’s 
‘anglosaxon competitors’ (Gilbert 1999; French Embassy in Australia 2002). As with the 
British ECS (if to a lesser extent), EduFrance attempted to ‘brand’ (labelliser) the French 
higher educational offer (Unattributed 2000a; Johsua 2005). 
 
François Blamont, the first Director of EduFrance, was particularly concerned to promote 
the involvement of private agencies and HEIs in international student recruitment. Hence, 
for example, he maintained that the ‘enemies of EduFrance are those professors who 
think that the provision of education must be 100% public’ (Johsua 2005). As he claimed, 
the objective of EduFrance, at least under his Directorship, was to ‘sell French 
universities like one would sell champagne and perfume’ (Unattributed 1999a). 
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In order to facilitate this, EduFrance developed a number of services which potential 
international students could pay for (Cauville 1999; Unattributed 1999b; Unattributed 
2000b; Gouvernement de France 2001). By encouraging ‘solvent students’ to attend 
French HEIs, the fees were described as having ‘a global effect on the French economy’ 
(Unattributed 1999c; Deprez 1999; Blamont reported in Cauville, 1999; Deforno 2002). 
François Blamont stated that he hoped the new services would enable the agency to 
‘”clothe” the courses proposed [by HEIs] by selling, key in hand, the services which 
allow one to live well in France’ (Unattributed 1999b).  
 
French HEIs argued against Blamont’s continued leadership of the agency, and 
interviewees suggest that this may have been one of the reasons why he was replaced by 
the more academic figure of Thierry Audric. Following the change, the agency has 
moderated some of its more ambitious attempts to foster the commodification of 
international students. Nonetheless, Cécile Deer has maintained that EduFrance’s 
development of chargeable services enabled the government to ‘recover part of the extra 
cost incurred by the acceptance of foreign students into the French system’ (Deer 2000, 
p.323). 
 
The extent to which French HEIs came to compete amongst themselves for the 
recruitment of international students, and to commodify such students, was limited in 
comparison with their British counterparts. Hence, French university presidents were 
concerned that government plans for international student recruitment, and especially the 
creation of the EduFrance agency, treated higher education as ‘merchandise’ (Trupin, 
 17
2001, p.37). EduFrance was criticized by the French government for failing to ‘convert 
[…] operators to the new methodological exigencies of international action’ 
(Gouvernement de France, 2001b). The government originally saw EduFrance’s role as 
‘contributing, through a dynamic and incentivising action towards HEIs, the 
improvement of [the French] system of recruitment and follow-up in comparison with 
[France’s] foreign partners’, yet HEIs themselves refused to follow this example (Gilbert 
1999).  
 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN LIBERALIZATION 
In both Britain and France, governments played the most important role in promoting 
liberalization. It was the decisions of governments, rather than HEIs, which led to 
attempts by the ECS and EduFrance to encourage the commodification of international 
students, and in Britain, competition between HEIs for international students. In contrast, 
HEIs often attempted to resist such commodification and competition, being more 
successful at this in France than in Britain.  
 
- Britain 
As described above, it was the actions of British governments (through accepting 
the recommendations made within the Pliatzky report to abolish the Inter-University 
Council, and those recommendations of British Council civil servants) that led to the 
creation of the ECS. 
 
The Inter-University Council was a university-run body which had mainly existed to 
foster relationships between British academics and African universities. The Inter- 
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University Council was scheduled for abolition by the Pliatzky review, which had been 
commissioned by the then government to examine and then rationalize the full range 
of ‘British quangos’ (Pliatzky 1980, p.77; Overseas Development Administration 1982, 
pp.20-1). The ECS’ role was to differ significantly from that of the university-controlled 
Inter-University Council.  
 
British Council civil servants suggested that, given recent changes to funding for 
international students (the introduction of ‘full-cost fees’), a new organization could 
allow HEIs to recoup some of the income they had lost, by giving them a ‘shop 
window’ to advertise themselves. As one former British Council employee maintained, 
the new agency would promote British higher education not to Africa and the ex-colonies 
but instead to people ‘who weren’t going to get any government scholarships …but 
who were wealthy’. As another former British Council employee stated, ‘it took a 
certain amount of proselytising’ before the idea of an ECS was accepted by HEIs 
and other sectoral actors.  
 
Since 1984, governments have continued to play a major role in defining the 
policies of the ECS. This was particularly the case with the creation of the 
‘EducationUK’ brand, which formed part of the so-called ‘Prime Minister’s 
Initiative’. According to interviewees, the Initiative was prompted by the Prime 
Minister’s encounter with the Mayor of Shanghai, who was a former Chevening 
Scholar.  
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The Prime Minister’s Initiative was announced in June 1999 at the London School of 
Economics. Alongside the branding exercize and new coordinating structures, the 
Initiative involved setting a target for an increase in the UK’s market share for 
international students to twenty-five percent by 2005. The EducationUK operation to 
‘brand British education as the first for quality and choice’ involved the cooperation of 
four private agencies (MORI, LD&A, Shandwick and McCann Erickson Manchester).  
 
Overall, therefore, British governments played a crucial role both in the creation of the 
ECS and in defining its activities. This was especially the case during the initiation of the 
EducationUK brand, which was explicitly linked with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
leadership. 
 
In contrast, British HEIs actively resisted some of the policy decisions taken in relation to 
the creation of the ECS. However, whilst they attempted at various points to alter the 
approach of the ECS, this normally produced few results. This reflects the inability of 
British HEIs to coordinate resistance to liberalization compared with their French 
counterparts. 
 
For example, the incorporation of the Inter-University Council into the British Council 
was opposed by HEIs, as well as by the staff (and former staff) of the Inter- University 
Council (Unattributed 1985). The Vice-Chancellor of Leeds University maintained that 
the ‘remarkable effectiveness of the Inter-University Council has in no small way 
depended on its insulation from direct government control’, which existed despite the fact 
that it was significantly funded by government (Boyle 1980). A number of Vice-
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Chancellors who were members of the Inter-University Council threatened to ‘withdraw 
cooperation with the government on overseas aid projects’ unless the Inter- University 
Council was retained as a separate organization from the British Council (albeit as a ‘unit 
attached to the British Council’). Ultimately, however, the Vice-Chancellors did not carry 
out their threat (O’Leary 1980). 
 
A number of British HEIs were also sceptical about the British Council’s proposals to 
create the ECS. One of the former British Council employees interviewed intimated that 
Oxford and Cambridge in particular strongly opposed the new plan, feeling that it would 
not sufficiently improve their existing promotional efforts. However, the Committee of 
Vice-Chancellors and Principals, then the universities’ sectoral association, did not play a 
major role in defining the ECS’ approach. The ECS was able to effectively divide 
between HEIs, by offering some (and not others) the use of its offices and special 
promotional services. This occurred without any coherent opposition from the 
universities’ sectoral association. Such criticism as did occur was limited in scope and 
had little effect, being generally expressed only by a small number of HEIs leaving the 
ECS (in particular, Oxford and Cambridge (Humfrey 1999, p.117)), rather than being 
mediated through the sectoral association. 
 
- France 
As with the ECS, EduFrance’s creation and its subsequent operations were subject to a 
significant degree of direction from government, rather than the organization being led by 
HEIs themselves. As early as 2000, the then Higher Education and Foreign Affairs 
ministers were able to maintain that their creation of EduFrance, along with other 
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initiatives, had allowed France to ‘meet the challenge’ of the international market in 
higher education (Allègre and Védrine 2000). Certainly, by 2001, EduFrance was 
credited by both its managing director (Rotman 2001) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Bourg- Broc 2001) as having achieved a significant increase in international student 
numbers since its inception, although the agency did not meet the then Higher Education 
Minister Claude Allègre’s target to double the numbers in four years (L’AEF 2000). 
 
Aside from the government’s financial influence on the agency, perhaps the most 
significant indicator of government control over EduFrance was the appointment of its 
first director, François Blamont, who was a strong supporter of the liberalization of 
international students’ policy. Despite criticism from a variety of sources (Delberghe 
1999; Renaud and Thoraval 1999), Blamont enjoyed in his new role the strong support of 
the ministers Védrine and Allègre (Lecadre and Thoraval 1999). It was only after a great 
deal of coordinated political activity by HEIs to change EduFrance’s orientation that 
Blamont moved on from EduFrance’s directorship after four years. 
 
Unlike successive French governments, but like their British counterparts, French HEIs 
were rather sceptical concerning the creation of a new agency focussed on international 
student recruitment. Interviewees maintained that a withdrawal of government funding 
for their own international organization, ARIES, in the mid- 1990s had reduced HEIs’ 
trust in government when it came to policies in international higher education. Such 
suspicion was heightened by the fact that the first figurehead for the new organization, 
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François Blamont, had a notorious reputation for his business dealings, and explicitly 
promoted the commodification of international students (Delberghe 1999). 
 
Interviewees stressed that pressure from HEIs, with the backing of the universities’ peak 
association, the Conférence des Présidents d’Université, led to Blamont not being re-
employed as the head of EduFrance after its first four-year period, with the position 
instead being taken up by the less controversial (and more academic) figure of Thierry 
Audric. Although Blamont’s removal coincided with a review of the agency, it does not 
appear that Blamont had hoped to retire at this point. 
 
HEIs were also ‘circumspect’ concerning EduFrance’s scope of action. They were 
particularly concerned about EduFrance’s provision of services to international students, 
due to the fees required to access these. A report by the former academic Albert Prévos 
articulated this concern, and was supported by many members of the Conférence des 
Présidents d’Université (Prévos 1999). Prévos, then the National Education Inspector, 
suggested that decision-making on the subject of international students should be 
devolved wherever possible to individual HEIs. Similarly, the parliamentarian Alain 
Claeys reported that HEIs were resisting EduFrance’s attempts to ‘become a new 
operator’, through itself offering international students services (Claeys 2000). HEIs were 
concerned that they would be ultimately penalized for ‘playing the game’ and 
cooperating with EduFrance (Claeys 2001). This contrasted with EduFrance’s then 
position, as articulated by Blamont, that ‘today, experts maintain that universities should 
rely on professional organizations [for the reception of international students] who 
understand what “welcome” and “service” mean, so that teachers can remain teachers and 
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universities can remain preoccupied with diffusing knowledge’, rather than following 
Prévos’ ‘idealist’ suggestions (L'AEF 2001). 
 
Overall, in France as in Britain, it was government which played the major role both in 
creating EduFrance and in directing its subsequent operations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This comparison of EduFrance and the ECS shows that regulatees may resist, rather than 
promote, liberalization. This was particularly effective in France but less so in Britain. It 
is interesting to briefly consider why this was the case. In Britain a number of factions 
have formed within the higher education sector, which have effectively divided the 
membership of the CVCP (such as the Russell Group, 94 Group and Campaign for 
Mainstream Universities). In contrast, no such associations have formed in France. 
Although some ‘networks’ of French HEIs have been grouped together as grandes écoles 
or as regional networks, such groups have not developed into distinct lobbying factions 
within their respective sectoral associations. The sectoral associations have been able to 
develop unified positions even concerning sensitive matters. In contrast, Kogan and 
Hanney have maintained that it is difficult for the CVCP (since renamed UniversitiesUK) 
to arrive at a common position (Kogan and Hanney, 2000: 212), and Peston and Ford 
have detected ‘little unity’ in the British higher education sector (Peston and Ford 1981, 
p.396).  
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To summarise, in contrast with the British HEIs’ sectoral associations, the French 
university and grandes écoles sectoral associations (the Conférence des Présidents 
d’Université, and the Conférence des Grandes Ecoles) are relatively strong, albeit 
bifurcated between two organisations. As a result, French HEIs have, generally, been 
better able to coordinate resistance against liberalization through their sectoral 
associations than their British counterparts. 
 
More fundamentally, the comparison also indicates the important part governments can 
play in pushing forward liberalization in the public sector. Governments are able to 
propose and legitimately institutionalize change, in a way that has been overlooked in 
many recent analyses of liberalization.  
 
Streeck and Thelen, and the other authors identified, downplayed the role of governments 
in liberalization, suggesting that their ability to introduce liberalization is dependent on 
the defection of sectoral actors from collective institutions. This contrasts with their 
insistence that the creation of collective institutions generally requires governments to 
play a major role. Hence, they maintain that ‘[n]onliberal reforms in a market economy 
seem to require ‘political moments’ in which strong governments create and enforce rules 
that individual actors have to follow’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005, p.33). This claim appears 
to rest on the notion that whilst collective institutions require authoritative intervention, 
markets can be created and maintained in the absence of governmental intervention. 
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However, in this case, governments played an important role in liberalization, both in the 
creation of liberalizing institutions and the maintenance of competition within them.  
 
This recognition of the role of governments in market-making and –control within the 
public sector parallels a number of other studies that have emphasized the historic 
importance of government intervention in the creation of modern economies and 
particular economic sectors (Evans, 1995; Vogel 1996; Weiss 1998; Fligstein 2001; 
Polanyi 2001; Blyth 2002; Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). The insights from such 
studies have infrequently informed analyses of economic liberalization. Yet there are 
many parallels between the creation of market-based institutions in the public sector and 
the older processes whereby the parameters of modern market-based economies became 
institutionalized. As Campbell and Lindberg note, governments have historically helped 
to ‘construct markets where there had never been commercial exchange to begin with…, 
or where alternative governance mechanisms had come to coordinate exchange’ (1991, 
p.349). Exactly this situation obtained in international student recruitment before 1979, 
where in both Britain and France, policies towards international students were dominated 
by colonial and foreign policy concerns, and HEIs were more likely to cooperate than 
compete with each other in the recruitment (or, as it was then, acceptance) of 
international students. 
 
Governments can attempt to institute, or deepen, markets in previously nonmarketized 
sectors, as in the case examined here, or to enforce competition in existing, but 
monopolistic or monopsonistic markets (Zysman and Tyson 1983, p.24; Cerny 1991, 
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p.184). Hence, King and Wood have noted that the US and UK government’s liberalizing 
policies significantly decreased the extent of coordination and increased the extent of 
competition, within certain sectors (King and Wood 1999, p.396; see also Scharpf 1991; 
Garrett 1998; Rieger and Leibfried 1998). This contrasts with the relative lack of 
involvement of regulatees in determining the shape of new markets in the public sector. 
Governments may, and indeed often have, attempted to extend or deepen liberalization in 
the absence of societal pressures towards marketisation (Goodman and Pauly 1993; 
Helleiner 1994). Furthermore, where governments possess and exercize the authority to 
create liberalizing institutions, other actors, as their regulatees, may resist the exercize of 
such authority. Unlike Streeck and Thelen’s economic actors, who revert to competition 
‘by default’, public sector actors may choose not to compete. Certainly, this case 
indicates that regulatees in the public sector may actively resist liberalization, and be 
successful in doing so when they coordinate this resistance, rather than playing the role of 
ready and willing market participants. 
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